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China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated 
International Law: A Historical Perspective from the 
Opium War to the South China Sea Arbitration Case 
Anlei Zuo* 
Abstract: 
China’s approaches to international law are an example of non-
Western peoples’ perspectives towards the Western-dominated inter-
national law. How has China understood and interacted with the West-
ern-dominated international law since its modern history? This re-
search provides a historical and evolutionary framework for “China 
and international law” to reveal China’s approaches to the Western-
dominated international law since the Opium War.  It finds that China 
is historically critical and culturally conservative, and since the Opium 
War, it has interacted with the Western-dominated international law in 
a reluctant, instrumental and pragmatic way. The research concludes 
that the final goal of China’s participation in international society and 
interaction with the Western-dominated international law has always 
been national rejuvenation. The South China Sea arbitration case illus-
trates the growing divergences between Chinese perceptions of inter-
national law and the Western-dominated international law that result 
from clash of ignorance” rather than a “clash of civilizations.”  Struc-
tural biases and systematic violence of Eurocentrism in the Western-
dominated international law and international legal scholarship are in-
tegral components of the “clash of ignorance,” and the rise of China 
could be an opportunity to rectify them with a more democratic and 
balanced approach.  
 
* Anlei Zuo. PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Email: zuo-
anlei2010law@gmail.com. 
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Introduction 
China, a great power in its long history, has been a resistor, taker 
and maker of the existing Western-dominated international law since 
the nineteenth century.1It is thus analytically representative and meth-
odologically effective to take China’s engagement and interaction with 
the existing Western-dominated international legal system as an exam-
ple for the relationship between “the Rest” and international law. It is 
also a unique and significant case study on a potential superpower and 
reformer of Western international law in view of the rise of China in 
the new millennium.2 More importantly, “China and Western interna-
tional law” provides an opportunity to historically and critically reex-
amine the evolution of the Western-dominated international law and 
nature of global governance by exposing the structural biases and sys-
tematic violence of Eurocentrism in Western-dominated international 
law for a more democratic and equitable world order. 
There are already many thought-provoking research works on 
China and Western international law regarding China’s engagement 
and interaction, application and observation, potential challenges and 
contributions to Western international legal system since late Qing.3 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Patrik K. Meyer, Why China Thinks It Can Build a Utopian World Order, THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST, Nov. 23, 2016; See Jacques DeLisle, China’s Approach to Inter-
national Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267 (2000) In this 
paper, the “Western-dominated international law” refers to the current international le-
gal system that has been mostly established and dominated by Western powers, namely, 
the Westphalian system; and “international law” also refers to the current international 
legal system, unless indicated otherwise. Generally, international law is understood as 
“the rules of conduct regulating the intercourse of states.” Thus, there were (and even 
still are) different international legal systems in different circles of civilizations, such as 
traditional Chines international law within the tribute system in ancient China.). 
 2.  See John Atkinson Hobson, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY 182 (1902); see Eric A.Posner & 
John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) ; see 
Barry Buzan, China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?, 3 CHIN. J. 
INT’L POLIT. 5 (2010). 
 3.  See, e.g., Phile C. W. Chan, CHINA, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER (2015); Phil C.W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law Since the 
Opium War, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859 (2014); see Andrew Coleman & Jackson Nya-
muya Maogoto, “Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: China in a Global-
ized World, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 237 (2013); Chi-hsiung Chang, A Comparison of Eastern 
and Western Principles of International Order: Suzerainty vs. Colonization, 79 BULL. 
OF THE INST. OF MOD. HIST. ACAD. SINICA 47 (2013); HANQINXUE, Chinese Contempo-
rary Perspectives on International Law: History, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2012); RUNE SVARVERUD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A WORLD ORDER IN LATE IMPERIAL 
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Also illuminating are other writings on China’s reception and percep-
tion of international law, China’s positive involvement with the inter-
national normative system in the Post-Mao Era, China’s pragmatic and 
flexible approach to international law in the Spratly Islands dispute, 
international law and the rise of China, China’s reform and opening-
up policy and international law, the application of international law in 
Chinese domestic courts, and Chinese observation and practices of in-
ternational law, etc. are illuminating.4 Moreover, Martti Koskenniemi, 
Lauri Mälskoo, and other scholars have provided insightful analyses 
and arguments regarding comparative international law.5 
It is imperative to historically and critically reexamine the nature 
of international law in order to rectify the Eurocentrism in international 
law and international legal scholarship.  Historical and critical studies 
of international law, as well as other studies from the perspective of 
international law and language, international law and culture, the soci-
ology of international law, international law and global governance, 
international law and international politics, etc. are also enlightening 
to comprehend the nature and the evolution of international law.6 
 
CHINA: TRANSLATION, RECEPTION AND DISCOURSE, 1847-1911 (2007); TIEYA WANG, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (1990). 
 4.  See Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, 
and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 445 (2004); 
Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-
1987, 21 INT’L LAW. 1127 (1987); Samuel S. Kim, The Development of International 
Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117 (1987); Michael 
Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly 
Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 425 (1991); DeLisle, supra note 1; Posner & Yoo, 
supra note 2; Congyan Cai, New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Cen-
tury, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L.755 (2013); Wang Zonglai & Hu Bin, China’s Reform and 
Opening-up and International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193 (2010); XueHanqin & Jin 
Qian, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L 
L. 299 (2009); Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of 
China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 269 (2016); Ann Kent, Compliance v Cooperation: China 
and International Law, 13 AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 19 (2006); ANN KENT, BEYOND 
COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2007); 
SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, 
CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING 
THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deborah Z. Cass et al., eds., 2003). 
 5.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative International Law, 20 FIN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1 (2009); LAURI MÄLSKOO, RUSSIAN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2015); see e.g., Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law: Framing the 
Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467, 469 (2015). 
 6.  See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004); DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, 
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However, several research gaps are still there. First, existing re-
search on Chinese and Western international law are far from over-
coming the Eurocentrism in international legal studies, or as Dipesh 
Chakrabarty puts it, the provincialization of Europe.7 Many writings 
are still stagnated in the Eurocentrism and unable to disentangle the 
relationship between the existing Western-dominated international le-
gal system and China; studies on “what is international law and what 
is international law for” from the perspectives of “the Rest” and “the 
Other” are inadequate. Significant topics remain to be elucidated, such 
as the inclusiveness of international law as a language and culture of 
global governance, and civilizational influences on different ap-
proaches to international law.8 Namely, the goal of taking “China and 
Western international law” as a case study on the evolution of West-
ern-dominated international law is not fulfilled yet. And second, many 
writings are unable to achieve the connection between the historical 
 
LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016); MARTII KOKENNIEMI, 
THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-
1960 (2002); MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005); Anne-Charlotte Martineau, The Rhetoric of 
Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2009); 
MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD 
MCWHINNEY (Sienho Yee & Jacques-Yvan Morin eds., 2009); BART LANDHEER, ON 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2012) (1966); 
RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Michael Byers ed. 2000); see ANN ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); 
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2004); GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL 
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004); B. S. Chimni, International 
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); 
CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012); Gustavo Gozzi, History of International Law and Western Civ-
ilization, 9 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 353 (2007); Brett Bowden, The Colonial Origins of 
International Law - European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilization, 7 
J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2005). 
 7.  See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND 
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2008). 
 8.  See, e.g., UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003). See B. S. Chimni, Asian Civilizations and 
International Law: Some Reflections, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 39 (2011); Lauri Mälksoo, The 
History of International Legal Theory in Russia: a Civilizational Dialogue with Europe, 
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 211 (2008); Onuma Yasuaki, When Was the Law of International 
Society Born? - An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Interciviliza-
tional Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2000). 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. VI, No. 1 
25 
and critical studies of “China and Western international law” on the 
one hand, and the nature and evolution of international law in the world 
society on the other hand. Thus, the writings are ineffective and inad-
equate in understanding the evolution of Western-dominated interna-
tional law in general and China’s approach to the Western-dominated 
international law; particularly in light of the past, present, and the fu-
ture. 
Therefore, the scope and purpose of this research is to focus on 
China’s perception and reception of Western-dominated international 
law from the Opium War (1839-1842) to the South China Sea arbitra-
tion (2013-2016), illustrating the Chinese perspective of history re-
garding the Western-dominated international law. It endeavors not on 
the specific historical or normative analyses, but on providing a frame-
work for “China and Western-dominated international law” to analyze 
China’s approaches to the Western-dominated international law. The 
research question is: how has China understood and interacted with the 
Western-dominated international law since its introduction to China in 
the nineteenth century? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction, 
section two focuses on the traditional Chinese international law in an-
cient China to lay the context of Chinese-Western confrontation of in-
ternational law. Section three elaborates on China’s approaches to the 
Western-dominated international law since the Opium War in the late 
Qing, Republic of China (“ROC”) and People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”). Section four takes the South China Sea arbitration case as a 
special case study on the contemporary dynamics of China’s ap-
proaches to the Western-dominated international law to illustrate the 
underlying historical origins and civilizational forces. Section five ex-
amines the evolution of both Western-dominated international law and 
China’s approaches in view of the rise of China and future of interna-
tional law. The last part concludes the paper. 
Traditional Chinese International Law in Ancient China 
Traditional Chinese mechanisms and rules of international rela-
tion in ancient “Chinese world order,” several widely acknowledged 
and essential conclusions. First, Ancient China had “certain fairly con-
sistent rules and usages” in the interstate conducts (i.e. diplomacy, con-
ferences and treaties) with systematic “usages, words and ideas corre-
sponding to the terms of Western modern international law” from the 
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Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period (722-221 
B.C.) to late Qing.9 
Second, compared to the Westphalian system of sovereign states 
in Western international law, rules and usages had unique cultural 
backgrounds, ethical contexts, political meanings and state inter-rela-
tion within the Chinese world order (namely the Sino-centric regional 
order).10 Traditional Chinese international law did not contain rhetoric 
of “sovereignty equality” or “independent state” but incorporated con-
cepts of “vassal states,” “barbarous state” and “foreign state.”11 The 
Relations among participants of this Chinese world order were unique 
compared to Western international law.12 
Finally, the Chinese tribute and “Eastphalian” state systems, as a 
system of rules and governance, were politically legitimate, economi-
cally effective and culturally dominant in China and East Asia’s long 
history until the intrusion of European states toward the end of the 
nineteenth century.13 Traditional ancient Chinese international law is 
an extension of Chinese culture and governance with layered hierar-
chical relations for order and harmony.14 Scholars summarized tradi-
tional Chinese world order mainly through sinocentrism and cultural 
supremacy, the concept of a universal State, civilization vs. barbarity, 
hierarchy and anti-egalitarianism.15 In the words of Benjamin I. 
Schwartz, it is “a peculiarly Confucian mystique of rule by virtue and 
an absolutization of the Confucian moral order.”16 
 
 9.  See L. Oppenheim, International Law 376 (H. Lauterpacht eds., vol. 1,1958), e.g., 
Wang, supra note 3, at 205-207. See Georges M. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent 
States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline, 8 How. L. J. 95 (1962); The 
Cambridge History of China 189 (Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1980). See 
Roswell S. Britton, Chinese Interstate Intercourse before 700 BC, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 616 
(1935). 
 10.  See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, CHINA’S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 6 (1960). 
 11.  See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 10 (1954); Shih-
Tsai Chen, The Equality of States in Ancient China, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 641 (1941); 
Chang, supra note 3; Wang, supra note 3, at 218. 
 12.  See Chang, supra note 3. 
 13.  See Coleman & Maogoto, supra note 3 (explaining “Eastphalian” is used in contrast 
with Westphalian to define the unique Chinese world order “under the heaven” (“tian-
xia”)). See ADDA B. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY: 
FROM THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO THE OPENING OF THE MODERN AGE 143 (2d ed.1960). 
 14.  See China’s Response to the West: Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 19 (S. Y. Teng & 
J. K. Fairbank eds., 1963). 
 15.  See Zhaojie Li, Traditional Chinese World Order, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 20 (2002). 
 16.  See Wang, supra note 3, at 215-16. 
 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. VI, No. 1 
27 
Compared with Western-dominated international law, how does 
traditional Chinese international law differ with respect to global dom-
inance? The governing foundations of traditional Chinese international 
law was in the universalization of its culture in the East Asia cultural 
circle. Chinese international law was also founded on the recognition 
of China’s authority by other countries and people of non-Chinese cul-
ture.17 Thus, the use of force was exceptional while cultural ascend-
ancy was the normal Chinese cultural emphasis on morality, order and 
harmony, such as “de” (the virtuous conduct), “li” (proper ceremony) 
and “fa” (law and regulation), were the main governance foundations.18 
Second, the traditional Chinese international law operated on the 
basis of the center and dominance of Chinese culture with layered gov-
ernance framework for order and harmony. The “world order under the 
heaven” (“tianxia”) consisted of the “Middle Kingdom” of China 
(“zhongguo”) and other subordinated states in the suzerainty system.19 
The hierarchical governance structure of traditional Chinese world or-
der had been more cultural and ethical dimensions rather than eco-
nomic or political dimensions in the kinship family of nations “under 
the heaven”. 
Third, regarding its governance paradigms, the main components 
are diversity, self-determination and non-ruling governance through 
the suzerainty system.20 Territorial sovereignty or annexation into the 
Middle Kingdom was not vastly sought while self-determination and 
the special relationship with the Middle Kingdom were carried out 
with cultural subordination and ethical obedience. Order and harmony 
in diversity had been one of the fundamental characteristics of tradi-
tional Chinese international law and worldview. 
Fourthly, regarding the specific governance institutions, the trib-
ute system is the main pillar of the Chinese “world order under the 
heaven” (“tianxia”) through cultural subordination, symbolic tributes 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Jan Zielonka, Empires and the Modern International System, 17 Geopolitics 502, 
506 (2012); see also James N. Rosenau, Illusions of Power and Empire, 44 WESLEYAN 
U. J. OF HISTORY AND THEORY 73 (2005) (discussing the exceptional uses of force were 
violent and even aggressive, which can be considered as the “operation and maintenance 
costs” or the dark sides of the traditional Chinese international law in ancient China). 
 19.  Zhao Tingyang, A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia), 
56 Sage J. 5, (2009). 
 20.  See, e.g., Tingyang Zhao, Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-
Heaven’(Tian-xia), 12 SOC. IDENTITIES 29 (2006). 
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and economic exchanges.21 No substantial exploitation or conquest had 
been performed regularly, as the final goal was the security and cul-
tural authority of the “Middle Kingdom.” That demonstrates the de-
fensive (other than the offensive) strategy of the Middle Kingdom Em-
pire rooted in Chines culture: the final goal is not the extension of 
China’s actual ruling or territory but the defensive security of the na-
tion and system.22 This goal is elastic, flexible and open to different 
dynasties and at different stages of national strength.23 
Fifth, some cultural dimensions of traditional Chinese interna-
tional law have survived the West-East confrontation and have been 
able to embody themselves in the contemporary Chinese culture. These 
dimensions have survived despite Western intrusion and subsequent 
modernization processes destroying its concrete foundations, struc-
tures, paradigms, and institutions. The evolution of Chinese culture, 
particularly its worldview and cultural fundamentals, is comparatively 
slow in comparison with Chinese revolutions, industrialization and 
modernization in the last two centuries.24 Thus, there are many “lines 
of continuities” in terms of political system, legal system, social gov-
ernance, foreign contacts, worldview and international law that form 
the domestic and international manifestations of China’s cultural genes 
and national identity.25 All those are the domestic and international 
manifestations of Chinese culture’s genes and China’s national iden-
tity. 
Therefore, traditional Chinese international law existed in ancient 
China in a legitimate, effective, and dominant relationship from its in-
ception to late Qing (as mechanisms and rules for international 
 
 21.  See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 182 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc., 
6th ed. 1975). 
 22.  See T. F. Tsiang, China and European Expansion, 2 POLITICA 1 (1936); See John K. 
Fairbank, Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West, 1 J. ASIAN STUD. 129 
(1942). 
 23.  See Yongjin Zhang& Barry Buzan, The Tributary System as International Society in 
Theory and Practice, 5 CHINA J. INT. POL. 3, 16-17 (2012).; Yongjin Zhang, System, 
Empire and State in Chinese International Relations, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 43, 53 (2001). 
 24.  See, e.g., ZHITIAN LUO, INHERITANCE WITHIN RUPTURE: CULTURE AND SCHOLARSHIP IN 
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA (Brill ed., 2015).  See AIGUO LU,CHINA AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY SINCE 1840 (Brill ed., 2000). 
 25.  See, e.g., KATHRYN BERNHARDT, CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Stan. 
Univ. Press 1994). See PHILIP C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN 
CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED (Stan. Univ. Press 2001). 
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relations and exchanges).26 There is no point in mechanical or rigid 
analogy (of rhetoric and concepts) between the traditional Chinese in-
ternational law and Western-dominated international law on the de-
scriptive level. Thus, the Eurocentrism in perceiving traditional Chi-
nese international law should be overcome by ontological and 
comparative perspectives towards the traditional Chinese world order 
and Western worldview.27 
From the perspective of international law as a language and cul-
ture of global governance, traditional Chinese international law is an 
extension of Chinese domestic governance culture, ideology and 
worldview.28 It is a political, cultural and ethical component of tradi-
tional Chinese national identity, culture dominance and worldview that 
have passed down from ancient Chinese world order all the way to the 
twenty-first century’s rise of China.29  Traditional Chinese interna-
tional law has been subordinated by the thrust of Western forces with 
economic exploitation and political oppression. However, but the cul-
tural genes of traditional Chinese international law have been evolving 
and functioning covertly in the modernization processes of China, par-
ticularly influencing China’s approaches to the Western-dominated in-
ternational law.30 
 
 26.  See ERIC HAYOT, THE HYPOTHETICAL MANDARIN: SYMPATHY, MODERNITY, AND 
CHINESE PAIN 10 (Kevin J. H. Dettmar & Mark Wollaeger eds., 2009); PHILIP HUANG, 
CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING (Stan. Univ. Press 
1996). 
 27.  See, e.g., Fassbender & Peters eds., infra note 83. 
 28.  See Chan, supra note 3, at 864; CHIH-YU SHIH, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: 
A PSYCHOCULTURAL VIEW (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990). 
 29.  See, e.g., Suisheng Zhao, Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the Imperial Cycle and 
the Rise of China, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 961 (2015). 
 30.  For instance, the Treaty of Nanking granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to Brit-
ain, the opening of five treaty ports and the cession of Hong Kong Island in 1842. Other 
subsequent unequal treaties had forcefully opened China’s market to Western power’ 
trade system. China’s sovereignty (including territorial integrity, national independence, 
tariff autonomy, etc.) had been profoundly undermined, leaving China to be a semi-
colonial state. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 282, 284. With the West as the powerful 
“Other”, the substantive adaption of the identity of China (as the “Self”) and the gov-
ernance paradigms of traditional Chinese international law (such as changes in the non-
direct governance of Tibet, Vietnam, etc.) has continued from the Opium War in the 
nineteenth century to the rise of China in the new millennium. 
 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
30 
China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated International 
Law since the Opium War 
China is a representative case on the “historical meaning of inter-
national law to non-Western peoples.”31 Since the Opium War between 
1839-1842, China has been forced into interacting with Western “civ-
ilized” powers (including Japan) in accordance with the Western-dom-
inated international law, while traditional Chinese world order and cor-
responding system of international rules were disintegrating.32 
Specifically, the economic interests in Sino-British trade and the con-
flicts of diplomatic protocols (stemming from different worldviews 
and different systems of international law) are the two main underlying 
reasons for the Opium War.33 The forced signing of the Treaty of Nan-
jing in 1842 is the starting point of China’s substantive interaction with 
Western-dominated international law in its modern historical pro-
cesses of endeavoring to save the nation and the people.34 
The Opium War marked the start of the so-called “century of hu-
miliation” (“bainianguochi”) for China during 1839-1949, as well as 
the start of modern Chinese history.35 More than five hundred “unequal 
treaties” were concluded in modern Chinese history, which had inten-
sively encroached on the sovereignty rights of China and public wel-
fare of Chinese people, this includes the ceding or leasing of territories, 
forced opening of the ports for trade, imposition of extraterritoriality 
on foreigners living in China, large amounts of reparations and loss of 
tariff autonomy.36 China’s past isolation and its reluctance to contact 
with the West, traditional rules of foreign relations and regional 
 
 31.  See Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
International Law? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 379, 406 (2007). 
 32.  Unless expressly stated otherwise in this paper, the “Opium War” refers to the First 
Opium War (1839–42), also known as the Anglo-Chinese War. John K. Fairbank, In-
troduction: the Old Order, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, VOLUME 10, LATE 
CH’ING, 1800-1911, PART 1 1-3 (John K. Fairbank eds., 1978). 
 33.  See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 3-13, 29 (2007). ELIZABETH 
COBBS HOFFMAN, AMERICAN UMPIRE 111 (2013). 
 34.  See Wang, supra note 3, at 238. 
 35.  See, e.g., Alison Adcock Kaufman, The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chi-
nese Perceptions of the International Order, 25 PAC. FOCUS 1 (2010). 
 36.  See DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 1–
2(2005). See, e.g., BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 229 
(2005); IMMANUEL C.Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 239 (1970); STUART. S, 
MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 89-90 (1977); Wang, supra 
note 3, at 252-53. 
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governance system were constantly defeated and torn apart, while 
Western international law were used to justify colonialism, imperial-
ism and hegemonism since the Opium War in the late Qing, Republic 
of China [ROC] and People’s Republic of China [PRC].37 
Chinese open-minded intellectuals and government officials in the 
late Qing who “opened their eyes to see the world” (kaiyankanshijie) 
realized that traditional Chinese world order could not cope with the 
invasion of the West by modern military force and economic coloni-
zation. This is because it had technologically lagged behind due to the 
First Industrial Revolution (1760s-1840s) in Europe and China’s great 
wall of self-isolation resultant of Sinocentrism, worldview of “Celes-
tial Empire” (tianchaoshangguo) and “Seclusion Policy” (biguansu-
oguo) in the Qing dynasty.38 Only by learning from the powerful West 
(including Japan) and taking advantage of all the existing resources 
could the goal of “saving the nation and people” (jiuguobaozhong) be 
possibly achieved.39 Thus, reform and modernization by learning from 
the West and Japan to preserve the Chinese culture and civilization had 
gradually attained widely acknowledged legitimacy through many de-
bates with respect to China’s modern state-building processes, includ-
ing both domestic affairs and international relations. 
Therefore, along with the deepening of China’s engagement and 
interaction with Western Powers and the Western-dominated interna-
tional law since the Opium War, China’s fundamental perspectives and 
approaches to the international law have been accumulatively and sub-
stantively formed since the late Qing. That is, might is right, and the 
Western-dominated international law is the accomplice of political op-
pression and economic exploitation as a language of power and inter-
ests.40 China has to learn from the West in order to take advantage of 
the Western-dominated international law to enter into “the family of 
 
 37.  See Fairbank, supra note 32, at 3, 6. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 1 (1999). See Anghie, supra note 6. 
 38.  See Fairbank, supra note 32, at 3. 
 39.  For example, the renowned intellectual, Qichao Liang, argued about the necessity and 
urgency of reform in his famous series of articles titled “General Ideas on Reform” 
(bianfatongyi) in 1896-1899. Also, Hongzhang Li, a famous Chinese politician, general 
and diplomat in the late Qing, argued for political reform and modernization so as to 
preserve the Chinese civilization against invasions of Western powers and Japan. 
 40.  See Wang, supra note 3, at 248. 
 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
32 
nations” and achieve national rejuvenation to save the nation and the 
people.41 
Specifically, with respect to its general attitudes, China has been 
interacting with the Western-dominated international law in a reluc-
tant, instrumental and pragmatic way since the Opium War. Regarding 
its historical engagement, China has taken advantage of the Western-
dominated international law in a historically critical and culturally con-
servative way as a result of its past experiences of political oppression 
and economic exploitation. Regarding the continuities and changes of 
its participation, China has been a passive resistor, progressive taker 
and proactive maker to the Western-dominated international law.  The 
final goal of China’s participation in international society and interac-
tion with the Western-dominated international law has always been na-
tional rejuvenation.42 
Specifically, in the late Qing period in 1840-1911, many contacts, 
corresponding governmental organs and unequal treaties were estab-
lished with the West, while the late Qing government was actually still 
functioning on the basis of traditional Chinese world order and consid-
ered the Western-dominated international law merely as some diplo-
matic tools to save itself in Sino-West conflicts.43 Therefore, the fun-
damental conflicts of worldview and governance paradigms (including 
specific diplomatic protocols, general principles, etc.) between inter-
national law in ancient China (within the tribute system) and the West-
ern-dominated international law (within the Westphalia system) re-
mained unchanged. Such “normative rejection of international law” 
was partaken not only by China but also by Western powers so as to 
deny China a civilized sovereign state in the “family of nations” and 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Yongjin Zhang, China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Stand-
ard of ‘Civilization’, 17 REV. OF INT. STUD. 3 (1991); Chan, supra note 3, at 77. 
 42.  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 4, at 128. See Samuel S. Kim, China and the United Nations, 
in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 42, 80 (Elizabeth Economy & 
Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999); Chan, supra note 3, at 77. 
 43.  For example, the Zongli Yamen was established in 1861 in charge of foreign policy in 
imperial China during the late Qing dynasty. See, e.g., IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, CHINA’S 
ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS, THE DIPLOMATIC PHASE, 1858-1880 121-123 
(1960); ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1842-1933 114-117 (2014); DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, CHINA, 1898-
1912: THE XINZHENG REVOLUTION AND JAPAN (1993); STEPHEN R. MACKINNON, POWER 
AND POLITICS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: YUAN SHI-KAI IN BEIJING AND TIANJIN, 1901-
1908 (1980). 
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thus realize their goal of political oppression and economic exploita-
tion.44 
With the urgent mission of reforming the country and those from 
the background of constant military defeats and concessions to foreign 
powers since the Opium War, a new form of learning was introduced. 
“[L]earning Western science and technology on the basis of Chinese 
culture and learning” (zhongtixiyong) was launched during the Self-
Strengthening Movement in the 1860s-1890s, despite that it failed by 
the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (jiawuzhanzheng) in 1894-
1895.45 Subsequently, Chinese people were increasingly skeptical to-
wards the traditional Chinese culture and political system.46 With more 
Western ideas pouring into societies, this new Western-dominated in-
ternational law and world order had partially replaced the previous tra-
ditional Chinese world order and international law system in both 
China and East Asia.47 After the final collapse of Qing dynasty and the 
establishment of the ROC in 1912, the Chinese governments and dip-
lomats were determined to enter into the family of “civilized” nations. 
This movement was focused on taking advantage of the Western-dom-
inated international law to protect Chinese national interests, despite 
that most of the time they failed.48 
In the period of the ROC in 1912-1949 and the PRC since 1949, 
there may be some changes in the specific approaches to the Western-
dominated international law and world order as a result of different 
ideologies, governments, etc. However, the main theme of all these 
administrations is the same: modern state building, entering into the 
family of nations and achieving national rejuvenation for Chinese peo-
ple.49 Under the context of the First World War, the Beiyang 
 
 44.  See Chan, supra note 3, at 868; GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” 
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 146, 164 (1984). 
 45.  See Wang, supra note 3, at 251; Allen Fung, Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chi-
nese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, 30 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 1007 (1996). 
 46.  See, e.g., Charlotte Furth, Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May 
Fourth Movement, 1895-1920, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, VOLUME 12, 
REPUBLICAN CHINA 1912-1949, PART 1 322-405 (John K. Fairbank eds., 1983). 
 47.  See, e.g., Zhaojie Li, International Law in China: Legal Aspect of the Chinese Perspec-
tive of World Order, Thesis (S.J.D.), University of Toronto (Canada) 87 (1996). 
 48.  For example, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Western powers refused 
China’s claims and transferred the Germany’s concessions on Shandong to Japan in-
stead. 
 49.  For example, both the governments support and inherit the Three Principles of the Peo-
ple (nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people) developed by Sun Yat-
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government (1913-1928) of the ROC attempted to use the Western-
dominated international legal rules to protect its territorial integrity and 
other sovereign rights. However, the Beiynag government failed in the 
face of power politics, particularly the “Twenty-One Demands” by Ja-
pan in 1915.50 
Western powers ignored China’s opposition against Japan’s ag-
gression, and Japan’s acquisition of Shandong and other goals were 
granted.51 Consequently, China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles 
and the May Fourth Movement was set off in 1919, which contributed 
to the Chinese communist movement.52 Chinese people began to re-
consider the nature of Western civilization and Western-dominated in-
ternational law.53 Thus, Chinese government and people were re-
minded that the Western-dominated international law is nothing but 
the tool and accomplice of colonialism, imperialism, international op-
pression and exploitation, power politics, etc. 
Afterwards, the Kuomintang government (1925-1948) of the 
ROC led the Chinese people to win the War of Resistance against Ja-
pan (1937-1945). The Kuomintang government succeeded in main-
taining that its borders to essentially those of the Qing (minus only 
Outer Mongolia) by pragmatic diplomacy and usages of the Western-
dominated international law, especially Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchu-
ria.54 However, the hope of abolishing unequal treaties imposed by 
Western powers in accordance with the doctrine of rebussic standibus, 
 
sen as part of a philosophy to make China a free, prosperous, and powerful nation. See 
LYON SHARMAN, SUN YAT-SEN: HIS LIFE AND ITS MEANING, A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 94, 
271 (1968). 
 50.  For example, China invoked Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to 
defend its sovereign rights over the Manchuria against Japan in 1931. Also, China ter-
minated the “unequal treaties” concluded with Belgium in accordance with Article 19 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the doctrine of rebus sic standibus in 
1926.  
 51.  See SETH P. TILLMAN, ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
OF 1919 333-34 (2015). 
 52.  See, e.g., ROCKY M. MIRZA, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: A RE-
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY: 1492-2006 332 (2007); XU 
GUOQI, CHINA AND EMPIRE, IN EMPIRES AT WAR: 1911-1923 233 (Robert Gerwarth & 
Erez Manela eds., 2014). 
 53.  See Furth, supra note 46, at 402. 
 54.  It is also known as “the Second Sino-Japanese War,” as opposed to the First Sino-Jap-
anese War of 1894-1895. See William C. Kirby, The Internationalization of China: For-
eign Relations at home and abroad in the Republican Era, 150 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 
433, 437 (1997); Chan, supra note 3, at 871-72. 
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had been frustrated for a long time until the height of the Second World 
War (under the context of US’s joining the Allies in 1941) and the 
establishment of the PRC, particularly the problem of extraterritorial-
ity and china as a “civilized” sovereign state.55 
During the period of the People’s Republic of China from 1949-
1978, China was regarded as a communist threat and enemy to the 
Western-dominated world society.56 China’s approaches to interna-
tional law in the PRC period could be understood through its attitudes 
towards the existing world order at that time and foreign policies to-
wards Western countries (especially the US). China’s attitudes and ap-
proaches to the Western-dominated international law can be found in 
several aspects: the reexamination of previous treaties concluded by 
the Kuomintang government and the Qing, “leaning to one side” pol-
icy, the doctrines of anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism, anti-colonial-
ism, “Three Worlds Theory,” “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-exist-
ence,” and support for national independence movement.57 
Particularly, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” rep-
resents China’s most fundamental and significant approach to West-
ern-dominated international law after China’s long way of struggling 
in semi-colonial times since the Opium War. The principles include no 
humiliation, political oppression or economic exploitation by Western 
 
 55.  See, e.g., Harold Scott Quigley, Extraterritoriality in China, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 
(1926). See William Callahan, Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the 
English School, 18 GLOBAL SOCIETY 305, 321 (2004). See Wang, supra note 3, at 248, 
261-62. See, e.g., China-United States: Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial 
Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters. 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 65 (1943). 
 56.  See GORDON H. CHANGE, FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND THE 
SOVIET UNION, 1948-1972 (1990). 
 57.  Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Adopted 
by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s PCC on September 29th, 1949), 
Article 55. Namely, it is anti-United States and for the Soviet Union. Between the spring 
and summer of 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong advanced three major principles of foreign 
policy, including “starting anew,” “putting the house in order before inviting guests” 
and “leaning to one side.” For more details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, Formulation of Foreign Policy of New China on the Eve of its 
Birth, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18057.
shtml. ZHIYU SHI, CHINA’S JUST WORLD: THE MORALITY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 4 
(1993). See Sandra Gillespie, Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of 
Mao’s Three Worlds Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations, in 
INTERCULTURAL COMM. & DIPL. 123 (Hannah Slavik eds., 2004); Hanqin Xue, Chinese 
Observations on International Law, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 83, 85-86 (2007). 
 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
2018  University of Baltimore School of Law 
36 
powers towards an independent new China.58 An interesting perspec-
tive is that these five principles, specifically the principle of sover-
eignty, non-aggression and non-interference, have already been al-
leged as pre-existing fundamental legal principles in the Western-
dominated international law, despite that they are merely considered 
as formal legal rules (or even rhetoric) in the books rather than in the 
actions towards non-Western nations.59 Comparatively, China’s em-
phasis on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” appears to be 
more substantive and anti-hegemonism, particularly among different 
countries and civilizations during different developmental stages.60 
Article 54 of the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Polit-
ical Consultative Conference (“CPCPPCC”), which was the provi-
sional constitution from 1949 to 1954, provided as follows:61 
The principle of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of 
China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory 
and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international 
peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, 
and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war. 
Also, the preamble of the 1954 Constitution of the PRC, which 
was the first constitution of the PRC during 1954-1975 based on the 
CPCPPCC adopted in 1949, in line with article 56 and 57 of the 
CPCPPCC, provided the following: “Our country’s policy of establish-
ing and extending diplomatic relations with all countries on the princi-
ples of equality, mutual benefit and respect for each other’s sover-
eignty and territorial integrity has already yielded success and will 
continue to be carried out.”62 
On the basis of the “World Revolution” approach to the existing 
world order in 1965 and the “Three Worlds Theory” firstly raised by 
 
 58.  See Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law, 8 
DALHOUSIE L. J. 3, 24-27 (1984); Hungdah Chiu, Communist China’s Attitude Toward 
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 245 (1966). 
 59.  For example, the United Nations Charter had substantively mentioned all those princi-
ples. See, e.g., Anghie,  
 note 6 (The improvised sovereignty doctrine). 
 60.  See, e.g., THOMAS CIESLIK, THE ROLE OF GREATER CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA, IN 
GREATER CHINA IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 161-184 (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo 
eds.,2010); YOUNG-CHAN KIM, CHINA AND AFRICA: A NEW PARADIGM OF GLOBAL 
BUSINESS 130-31 (2017). 
 61.  The Common Program of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, art. 
54, Sept. 29, 1949. 
 62.  Id. at art. 56-57. 
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Mao Zedongin 1974, Mao’s attitudes towards the West (and even the 
whole “Other”) were both radical and conservative, idealistic and re-
alistic, as well as succeeding and negating the previous methods and 
experiences.63 That is, ideological concerns, as well as nationalism and 
internationalism, were operating simultaneously in the making of 
China’s worldview and foreign policies (which was dominated by Mao 
in 1949-1976). For example, the “leaning to one side” policy in the 
1950s was based on both ideological reasons and realistic concerns of 
national interests, while the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was more 
about the leadership of international communist movement.64 On one 
hand, the underlying motivations of the evolutionary approach to the 
existing world order were ideological concerns, and on the other hand, 
institutional and realistic reasons, as the PRC had not participated in 
the formulation and design of the existing post-World War II world 
order. Moreover, its previous historical experiences during the “cen-
tury of humiliation” led to substantial political distrust of the West.65 
Apparently, China was not only ideologically conservative and 
critical towards the existing international legal order (particularly the 
imperialism and United States) at that time. It also directly 
 
 63.  See People’s Daily, Chairman Mao’s Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds 
is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, Nov. 1, 1977; Chen Jian, China and the 
Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations, in BANDUNG 
REVISITED: THE LEGACY OF THE 1955 ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER144-46 (Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya eds., 2008). See, e.g., Li Jie, Changes in 
China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations, in RE-EXAMING THE 
COLD WAR: U.S. – CHINA DIPLOMACY, 317-19, 1954-1973 (Robert S. Ross & Changbin 
Jiang eds., 2001); Dhruba Kumar, Mao and China’s Foreign Policy Perspectives 
(1989); Huiyun Feng, CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-
MAKING: CONFUCIANISM, LEADERSHIP AND WARn47, 59 (2007); Houman A. Sadri, 
REVOLUTIONARY STATES, LEADERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF CHINA, CUBA, AND IRAN 55-57 (1997); Carol Lee Hamrin, Elite Politics and the De-
velopment of China’s Foreign Relations, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 70-109 (Thomas W. Robinson & David L. Shambaugh eds., 1995). 
 64.  See, e.g., Frederick C. Teiwes, Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF, vol. 14, The People’s Republic, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, 
PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1949-1965 (Roderick Macfarquhar 
& John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Allen S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split, in THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY 478-538. 
 65.  See, e.g., Frederick C. Teiwes, Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF, vol. 14, The People’s Republic, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, 
PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1949-1965 (Roderick Macfarquhar 
& John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Allen S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split, in THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY 478-538. 
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confrontational and rejective, as the Western-dominated international 
law has always been considered as the mouthpiece of hegemonism, 
imperialism, international oppression and exploitation towards non-
Western countries due to its low inclusiveness.66 Also, China believed 
that it could achieve the goal of national rejuvenation by confrontation 
against the existing Western-dominated world order. However, due to 
Mao’s revolutionary movements and other policies of ideological con-
frontation, China had stayed in poverty; and the dream of national re-
juvenation had stranded for decades with both traditional Chinese cul-
ture and Western-dominated international law stigmatized.67 
In October 1971, the PRC government replaced the Taiwan gov-
ernment as the representative government of China in the United Na-
tions (“UN”).68 Despite its continuous hostility towards the UN and 
Western-dominated international legal system, such as its non-recog-
nition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice (“ICJ”) in 1972, China started to gradually engage with and inte-
grate into the Western-dominated international legal order.69 
During the period of the PRC since 1978 with the new national 
policy of “reform and opening-up,” the focus of Chinese domestic pol-
icies changed from “class struggle” to economic development, as it 
was believed by the new leaders (especially Deng Xiaoping) that peace 
and development (rather than war and revolution) are the major themes 
of this era and also the primary needs of China.70 China’s foreign pol-
icies have came back to the pragmatic approach of “independent for-
eign policy of peace,” which includes: (1) safeguarding its independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) anti-hegemonism for 
world peace, (3) promoting the establishment of a more democratic 
 
 66.  See China Calls Arbitral Court “Mouthpiece” for Certain Groups, XINHUA NEWS (July 
4, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/04/c_135488172.htm. 
 67.  See Hungdah Chiu, Communist China’s Attitude toward International Law, 60 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 245 (1966).  
 68.  See G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic 
of China in the United Nations (Oct. 25, 1971). 
 69.  See Natalie G. Lichtenstein, The People’s Republic of China and Revision of the United 
Nations Charter, 18 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 629 (1977); Chan, supra note 3, at 886. 
 70.  See, e.g., CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM: A STUDY WITH DOCUMENTS 80 (Christopher 
Howe et al. 2003); Yang Yi, Modernization of China’s National Defense, in 
TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CHINA241-
42, 1978-2008 (Wang Yizhou eds., 2011). 
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and equitable new international political and economic order, and (4) 
upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, etc.71 
Deng Xiaoping believed that China’s national rejuvenation, par-
ticularly economic reform and development for the purpose of “four 
modernizations,” could only be achieved within the existing Western-
dominated world order and international legal system.72 Therefore, un-
der the guideline of “keep a low profile and achieve something” 
(taoguangyanghui, yousuozuowei), China’s goal is to achieve eco-
nomic and political reform within the framework of Western-domi-
nated world order and international law through general learning from 
the West and effective sinicization to the needs of China (with Chinese 
characteristics).73 Thus, China’s approach has become pragmatically 
taken advantage of existing international law to achieve economic and 
political reform for the purpose of national rejuvenation.74 
Therefore, China has deeply embraced the Western-dominated in-
ternational economic order while refusing to comprehensively partici-
pate in international human right law, international dispute settlement 
by judicial means, international criminal law, and other sensitive areas 
of international law. It is evident that China has been still under the 
past shadow of “economic exploitation and political oppression” by 
foreign powers by virtue of international law as a language of power 
and interests.75 To some extent, the independent and peaceful path of 
economic development and political reform “with Chinese character-
istics” since 1978 is the modified version of the “learning Western sci-
ence and technology on the basis of Chinese culture and learning” 
 
 71.  It is also called China’s “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy.” See 
China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (Sept. 19, 2003), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng
/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/zcyjs_663346/xgxw_663348/t24 942.shtml (It is also called 
China’s “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy.”) 
 72.  The Four Modernizations include the modernization of agriculture, industry, science 
and technology, and the military. See Mingjiang Li, Rising from Within: China’s Search 
for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations, 17 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 331 (2011). 
 73.  See, e.g., Yan Xuetong, From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement, 153 
CHINESE. J. INT. POLIT.184 (2014); Zhu Liqun, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY: ADAPTATION AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 41-42 (Jinjun Zhao &Zhirui Chen 
eds., 2014). 
 74.  See RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG 
XIAOPING56-57 (1996) (The underlying philosophy is still to learn from the West to save 
the nation and the people). 
 75.  See Kim, supra note 4, at 157. 
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(zhongtixiyong) movement in 1860s-1890s, in spite of different con-
texts and narratives. 
Afterwards, different leaders of the PRC would constantly update 
and interpret these principles by adopting specific policies and new 
concepts in different contexts and for different needs. Some of these 
needs include, “China as the largest developing country,” “China’s 
peaceful development” and “build a harmonious world,” “China’s core 
interests,” “new type of great power relations,” “never seek hegem-
ony,” “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Chinese dream,” 
“two centennial goals,” “community of shared future for mankind,” 
etc.76 The final goal has always been to become a great power to effec-
tively achieve national rejuvenation without direct confrontation with 
the West and existing international legal system in accordance with 
Deng’s guideline. 
In June 2016, Russia and China adopted a declaration on the pro-
motion of international law to “enhance their cooperation in upholding 
and promoting international law and in establishing a just and equitable 
international order based on international law,” emphasizing the “prin-
ciples of international law” and criticizing double standards in the 
Western-dominated international law.77 This declaration is in line with 
 
 76.  See Marcia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: New Kid in the Developing Bloc? 
HEBREW UNIV. INT’L L. 2-07; Xue, supra note 3, at 94, 169, 200; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China Issues White Paper on Peaceful De-
velopment (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepa-
per_665742/t856325.shtml; WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI 
JINPING: RENAISSANCE, REFORM, OR RETROGRESSION? 193-94 (2015). Toshi Yoshihara 
& James R. Holmes, Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the South China Sea?, 34 
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 45 (2011); Qi Hao, China Debates the ‘New Type of 
Great Power Relations’, 8 CHINESE. J. INT. POLIT. 349 (2015); Dingding Chen &Jianwei 
Wang, Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strat-
egy, 9 CHINA: AN INT’L J.195, 198 (2011); Zheng Wang, Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: 
The “Chinese Dream”, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 05, 2013), http://thediplomat.com
/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. HEATH, CHINA’S NEW GOVERNING 
PARTY PARADIGM: POLITICAL RENEWAL AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL REJUVENATION 
218 (2016); H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Speech at the 
United Nations Office at Geneva, Switzerland: Work Together to Build a Community 
of Shared Future for Mankind (Jan. 18, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
01/19/c_135994707.htm. 
 77.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the Rus-
sian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International 
Law (June 26, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393
/t1386141.shtml. 
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previous China-Russia Joint statements in 1997, 2005, 2008, etc.78 As 
China and Russia have always considered the existing Western-domi-
nated international legal system as the hegemonic tool with structural 
biases for the dominance of the West, it vividly illustrates divergences 
and struggles among different approaches to international law by 
Western and non-Western powers.79 China has been sticking to the 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and adhering to the estab-
lishment of a “New International Economic Order” because of its his-
torical sufferings and traditional worldviews.80 
There are lines of continuities and changes in China’s approach to 
international law from ancient China, late modern China, to the pre-
sent. Chinese perceptions of the Western-dominated international law 
are based on many aspects that are inherited and reinforced as parts of 
China’s culture, worldview, history, and national identity.81 China, as 
the world’s oldest continuous civilization pushing through thick and 
thin, has been evolutionary in its foreign policy, worldview, and cul-
ture of governance.82 Understanding the origins and forces in Chinese 
culture and history provides a framework for the lines of continuities 
 
 78.  See Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation On 
Major International Issues, 23 May 2008; Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21st Century, 1 July 
2005; Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on 
A Multi-polar World and the Establishment of A New International Order, 23 Apr. 1997. 
 79.  See Lauri Mälksoo, Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Inter-
pretation of International Law, EJIL: TALK! (July 15, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/russia-and-china-challenge-the-western-hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-interna-
tional-law/; see also Ingrid Wuerth, China, Russia, and International Law, L. FARE 
BLOG (July 11, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/china-russia-and-international-
law; Fu Ying & Wu Shicun, South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage, THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST (May 9, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-sea-
how-we-got-stage-16118. 
 80.  See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), ¶ 4 (May 1, 1974). 
 81.  See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 287.  
 82.  See Hobson, supra note 2, at 182; see also Zhao, supra 29, at 962. For example, the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Chinese understandings on the “democratic 
deficits” of the Western-dominated international legal system, global governance para-
digms, etc., have been important components of Chinese perceptions towards the West-
ern-dominated international law and global governance. Their underlying origins are 
from traditional Chinese worldview of “world order under the heaven” (“tianxia”), the 
utopian goal of “great peace” (“da tong”), etc. The concept of “Community of Common 
Destiny” (“mingyungongtongti”) initiated by President Xi Jinping also demonstrates 
Chinese worldview, final goal and global governance paradigms in contrast with West-
ern analogues. 
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and changes in China’s approaches to international law since the 
Opium War. 
South China Sea Arbitration Case: “Yesterday Once More” in 
Chinese History of the Western-dominated International 
Law 
It is always necessary to understand the current situations of inter-
national law in the context of the historical evolution (and interaction) 
of China and the West in order to formulate general frameworks and 
accurate insights of the past, present and future.83 Comparatively, pro-
gress in scientific technologies amidst the industrialization and mod-
ernization processes could be made in a prompter way than changes in 
the culture of nations. It is true that China has made great progress in 
industrialization and modernization in the last century (particularly 
since 1978), but there is much continuity warranted between the tradi-
tional and contemporary China on the cultural aspects of its basic 
worldviews and national identity.84 The legal system, particularly in-
ternational law as the extension of domestic governance culture in a 
certain civilization, could illustrate that point.85 This connection and 
contextualization are necessary for historical and critical understand-
ings of the contemporary international law and future world order, par-
ticularly in light of China’s experiences in its late modern history and 
the rise of China in the twenty-first century.86 
China’s critical and conservative attitudes towards the Western-
dominated international law has always hangs there as the shadow of 
the modern history of “century of humiliation.”87 China’s emphasis on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, its hostility to interna-
tional (quasi-) judicial dispute settlement mechanisms, its desire to 
learn from the West and also reform the existing Western-dominated 
 
 83.  See Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global History Of In-
ternational Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HIST. OF INT’L LAW 1, 24 (Bardo 
Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); Shin Kawashima, China, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HIST. OF INT’L LAW 451, 473 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters 
eds., 2012).  
 84.  See, e.g., Zhao, supra note 82, at 367. 
 85.  See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 276. 
 86.  See G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal 
System Survive?, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23 (2008); Philip R. Trimble, International Law, 
World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN L. REV. 811 (1989). 
 87.  See Kim, supra note 5, at 157. 
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international law system for a more democratic and equitable world 
order, etc. have demonstrated China’s fundamental approaches to in-
ternational law.88 As such, a representative and latest example is the 
South China Sea arbitration case in 2013-2016, which vividly illus-
trates China’s contemporary approach to the Western-dominated inter-
national law in the twenty-first century.89 
Generally, there are several significant political and legal aspects 
of the South China Sea arbitration case. Firstly, China does not recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Annex 
VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) as “the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is 
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South 
China Sea.” Despite that, China’s position of non-acceptance and non-
participation did not bar this Tribunal from proceeding with the arbi-
tration.90Secondly, the arbitration award comprehensively supported 
most of the Philippines’s claims and ruled against China with a con-
troversial approach of “progressive and ambitious” interpretation to 
relevant clauses, declaring the nine-dash line invalid and even the big-
gest naturally formed island in Nansha Islands, Taiping Island (Itu 
Aba), as no “fully entitled island.”91 Thirdly, the arbitration case is in-
itiated with profound political elements under the context of America’s 
“Asia-Pacific Rebalance” Strategy since 2012 and the rhetoric of “the 
rise/threat of China” in international politics, and the arbitration award 
 
 88.  See, e.g., SOPHIE RICHARDSON, CHINA, CAMBODIA, AND THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (2010). See Julian Ku, China and the Future of International 
Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 154 (2012); James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, 
Chinese Methods of Resolving International Trade, Investment, and Maritime Disputes, 
23 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 619 (1987); CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
(Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2008); William A. Callahan, Chinese Visions 
of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?, 10 INT’L STUD. REV. 749 
(2008). 
 89.  See Debate Map: Disputes in the South and East China Seas, OXFORD PUB. INT’L LAW, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/222/debate-map-disputes-in-the-south-and-east-china-
seas (last updated Mar. 23, 2017). 
 90.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South 
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (“China’s Position 
Paper”), 7 December 2014, ¶ 4.  
Annex VII of the UNCLOS provides that the “[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to 
defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.” 
 91.  See PCA Case No. 2013-19 of 2016, The South China Sea Arb. ¶¶ 632, 643-48; China’s 
Position Paper, supra note 90, ¶¶ 19-22.  
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seems to do no good but only bring about chaos to the South China Sea 
and Asia.92 Fourthly, many Western countries, such as the US and Aus-
tralia, pressed China to enforce the arbitration award, while many other 
countries are for bilateral negotiations to resolve the disputes.93 
There is no doubt that China will not recognize or enforce the 
award, and the South China Sea has entered into a new round of big-
power political gambling and geopolitical rivalries, particularly be-
tween the US and China.94 The arbitration award is neither a game 
changer nor going to have real-world legal impacts due to China’s non-
recognition, but rather another rhetoric in international politics and a 
bargaining chip in the grand chessboard.95 International law has ex-
posed its close relationship (or even subordination) to international 
politics, as well as the mystery of global governance, the myth of in-
ternational rule of law, the structural biases of Eurocentrism and low 
inclusiveness of the Western-dominated international law, and also 
other paradoxes thereof.96 Once again, international law holds a 
 
 92.  See Robert S. Ross, The Problem With the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnec-
essary and Counterproductive, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS70 (2012); Bonnie Glaser & Brit-
tany Billingsley, US-China Relations: US Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance, 13 
COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS29 (2011); Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law 
and the Rise of China, 7 CHINESE. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006); Barry Buzan, China in Interna-
tional Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible? 3 CHINESE. J. INT’L. POLIT. 5 (2010); Feng 
Zhang, South China Sea Arbitration Award: Breathtaking (But Counterproductive), THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST (July 16, 2016) http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/south-
china-sea-arbitration-award-breathtaking-17004. 
 93.  See U.S. Dep’t of State, Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration, (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.; Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Australia Supports Peaceful Dispute Resolution In The South China Sea (July 
12, 2016), http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx.; M. 
Taylor Fravel et. al., What Is the Future of the South China Sea?, FOREIGN POLICY (July 
12, 2016)., http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/what-is-the-future-of-the-south-china-
sea/. 
 94.  See Leszek Buszynski, The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China 
Strategic Rivalry, 35 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY139 (2012); Jane Perlez & Chris 
Buckley, U.S. and Beijing Offer Competing Views on South China Sea, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/world/asia/us-south-china-
sea-talks.html?_r=0. 
 95.  See Diane Desierto, The Philippines v. China Arbitral Award on the Merits as a Sub-
sidiary Source of International Law, EJIL TALK (July 12, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org
/the-philippines-v-china-arbitral-award-on-the-merits-as-a-subsidiary-source-of-inter-
national-law/; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY 
AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES (1997). 
 96.  See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); 
FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1985); EDWIN 
 
_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2018  11:37 AM 
ILS Journal of International Law  Vol. VI, No. 1 
45 
position of powerlessness, perplexity, non-enforcement, crisis of legit-
imacy and inclusiveness.97 Moreover, the South China Sea arbitration 
case is a new layer of these unhappy memories of the Western-domi-
nated international law for China, as the Western-dominated interna-
tional law has come with humiliation, exploitation and oppression in 
terms of “international law’s meaning to non-Western nations and peo-
ples.”98 The Western-dominated international law has not always been 
part of the solution, but rather part of the problem.99 
Moreover, this arbitration case demonstrates different perceptions 
and conceptions of international law by China and Western countries, 
which originates from different historical experiences, civilizational 
geneses, worldviews, and cultures. On the one hand, China believes 
that it has enjoyed the sovereign rights over these islands in the South 
China Sea since the Second World War and these rights have been 
widely recognized.100 More importantly, these sovereign and historic 
rights are exercised by both effective control and Chinese traditional 
way of non-ruling governance, and they should be fully respected in a 
manner of justice and fairness.101 China considers them as basic histor-
ical facts and the Western-dominated international law should not be 
intentionally or strategically interpreted to undermine them without 
sufficient consideration of the history of the disputes regions and 
 
EGEDE & PETER SUTCH, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE (2013). 
 97.  See Joseph Klein, South China Sea: UN Law of the Sea Arbitration Tribunal Sinks the 
Rule of Law, (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/08/20/south-
china-sea-un-law-of-the-sea-arbitration-tribunal-sinks-the-rule-of-law/; Jacques de 
Lisle, The South China Sea Arbitration Decision: China Fought the Law, and the Law 
Won. . ..Or Did It?, (July 12, 2016), http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/south-china-
sea-arbitration-decision-china-fought-law-law-won/. 
 98.  See K. J. Noh, Making a Mockery of International Law: the Arbitral Tribunal on the 
South China Sea Prepares the Way for War, (July 19 2016), http://www.counter-
punch.org/2016/07/19/making-a-mockery-of-international-law-the-arbitral-tribunal-
on-the-south-china-sea-prepares-the-way-for-war/. 
 99.  See KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 266-72; FRIEDRICH 
KRATOCHWIL, THE STATUS OF LAW IN WORLD SOCIETY: MEDITATIONS ON THE ROLE 
AND RULE OF LAW 2(2014); Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International Insti-
tutions, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 34, 43-44 (2001). 
 100.  See generally THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (Stefan 
Talmon & Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014). 
 101.  See Fu Ying, Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea, FOREIGN 
POLICY, July 10, 2016; China’s Position Paper, supra note 90; Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing 
Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 
AM. J. INT’L L.98 (2013). 
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entitlements.102 Also, as China had issued the jurisdiction exclusion 
declaration, nobody should force China into some Western-dominated 
proceedings in view of all these humiliations China had endured in the 
last two centuries of political oppression and economic exploitation.103 
However, on the other hand, a few countries in the ASEAN and some 
Western countries behind the scene claim that all these rights are am-
biguous and undergoing changes by effective control of islands, the 
ratification of the UNCLOS and the evolution of other international 
rules. 
International legal rules could always be interpreted and argued in 
many ways to support totally different (or even contradictory) claims, 
to justify or outlaw various conducts; and the existing Western-domi-
nated international law has always been closely related to Western 
powers and their interests in its historical evolution from the periods 
of colonization, imperialism, and hegemonism, to the contemporary 
mystery of global governance and myth of global rule of law.104 To a 
great extent, the existing Western-dominated international law is the 
extension of Western values and worldviews while alternatives from 
other civilizations are suppressed and ignored, and thus the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of international law are undermined as a result of its 
inclusiveness and representativeness deficits.105 It has been happening 
in Africa, Middle East, South China Sea and many other places that 
the Western-dominated international law has not been the tool for 
global justice or the solution to global governance dilemmas, but the 
reinforcer of the existing structural biases or part of the systematic vi-
olence.106 
It goes to the heart of the fundamental question: what is the West-
ern-dominated international law and what is the Western-dominated 
international law for? From the perspective of historical and critical 
 
 102.  See Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems 
of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q.37 (1997). 
 103.  See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 288, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397. 
 104.  See Simpson, supra note 6; Focarelli, supra note 6, at 4.; Tom J. Farer, Political and 
Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law. 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (1985); 
Anghie, supra note 6, at 32. 
 105.  See Brzezinski, supra note 95, at 24-29. 
 106.  See David Kennedy, Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L.7 (2013) (The inequality and injustice in the international political and economic life 
are the creature of international law). 
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studies of international law, these are glimpses of the dark sides of the 
Western-dominated international law since its inception.107 That’s why 
it should not be defined as the “clash of civilizations” but the “clash of 
ignorance.”108 That is, the structural biases of Eurocentrism and igno-
rance in international law give rise to the systematic violence of global 
governance and struggles of non-Western people. 
China’s approaches to international law have been a representa-
tive part of that grand story. For instance, China’s hostility to interna-
tional judicial mechanisms comes from: (1) its historical experiences 
of the dark sides of international law, (2) its belief in justice and fair-
ness in the naturalism rather than the legal positivism of international 
law; and (3) its traditional desire of order and harmony in Asia through 
non-Western non-judicial manners.109 The existing Western-domi-
nated international law is considered by many non-Western nations, 
particularly China, as the legal tool for the pursuit of interests in inter-
national politics, the language of Western values and worldviews, and 
an integral part of the culture of Western-dominated governance 
 
 107.  See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law–20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 7 (2009). Kennedy, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE, supra note 6; Orford, READING 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 6. 
 108.  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 73 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 22 (1993); Edward W. Said, The Clash of Ignorance, THE NATION, October 
22, 2001, at 1; Karim H. Karim & Mahmoud Eid, Clash of Ignorance, 5 GLOB. MEDIA 
J. – CAN. ED.7 (2012). (“The clash of ignorance provides a critique of the clash of civi-
lizations theory by addressing the particular problem of ignorance in intercultural and 
international interactions. It challenges the assumption of the Self and the Other, and it 
argues that the causes of global governance dilemmas “are not to be found in an una-
voidable clash of civilizations but in ignorance”. Namely, the “clash of civilizations” 
theory and other similar scholarship are abstract and constructed distortion of the reality, 
which are detached from the reality and ineffective to describe, analyze and critique the 
reality. The power-knowledge co-production entrenches structural biases and systematic 
violence into the scholarship to main the structural biases (power, interests and injustice) 
in global governance. This “clash of ignorance” critique could also apply to international 
law and international legal scholarship to reveal the structural biases thereof. And those 
dark sides of international law, structural biases in international legal scholarship, etc., 
have been pointed out by many other critical studies of international law.). 
 109.  See Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case be-
tween the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines, http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/files/CLM51MS.pdf.; Institute for Security & Development Policy, Under-
standing China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, BACKGROUNDER, (June 
2016), http://isdp.eu/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-dis-
putes/; China’s Position Paper, supra note 90. 
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paradigms.110 The myth of “international rule of law” seems to be the 
rule of Western-dominated international law for Western-dominated 
global governance paradigms.111 
The South China Sea arbitration case reveals different historical 
narratives of Western-dominated international law, different imagina-
tion of global governance and different ideas of world order. The arbi-
tration case also exposes the ignorance and struggles that “the Rest” 
have endured from the West in terms of the structural biases and sys-
tematic violence of Eurocentrism in international law and international 
legal expertise. It subtly unfolds the ignorance and structural biases in 
existing international legal scholarship, particularly the blind spots on 
the dark sides of Western-dominated international law and overstate-
ments of its nobility. This arbitration case provides a good critique on 
expansionist arguments and progressive narratives of the Western-
dominated international law in view of the historical expansion of Eu-
ropean international law.112 Different narratives of history, diverse im-
agination of orders and worldviews, and disparate language and culture 
of global governance are more fundamentally significant than tech-
nical and legal debates within the legal positivism of international law 
in the South China Sea arbitration case. 
The South China Sea arbitration case illustrates the conflicts be-
tween Chinese perceptions of international law and the Western-dom-
inated international law since the Opium War.113 China’s approaches 
to international law are based firstly on its traditional worldview and 
culture (particularly the beliefs in naturalistic justice and fairness, and 
desire of order and harmony through non-Western non-judicial man-
ners), and secondly on its historical experiences with the Western-
dominated international law. China has been conservative towards 
 
 110.  See Monica Garcia-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law, 
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 599, 602 (2014) (book review).; Steven R. Ratner, The Thin Justice 
of International Law: A Moral Reckoning on the Law of Nations, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1169, 1170 (2015) (book review). 
 111.  See DAVID KENNEDY, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 51 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND 
JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (Martinus Mijhoff, 1st ed. 2003). 
 112.  See Jochen von Bernstorff, International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in 
International Law and Politics, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.977, 989 (2014). 
 113.  See Li Chen, Universalism and Equal Sovereignty as Contested Myths of International 
Law in the Sino-Western Encounter, 13 J. HIST. INT’L. L. 75 (2011). 
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Western-dominated international law as a result of international law’s 
dark sides and lack of inclusiveness. The divergences among different 
perceptions of current Western-dominated international law are very 
likely to increase.114 Thus, current Western-dominated international 
law and global governance paradigms are undergoing potential crises 
of legitimacy and effectiveness due to the Eurocentrism and “clash of 
ignorance.” The South China Sea arbitration case is a scene of “yester-
day once more” in Chinese history. 
The Rise of China and the Future of International Law 
The existing international legal system has inherited much from 
colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, etc. in a close and continuing 
historical relevance of the past.115 The history and contemporary evo-
lution of international law are woven into the same narratives, dis-
course, knowledge, language and culture of international law, global 
governance and international legal scholarship.116 International law is 
utilized to name and rename, mythicize and re-mythicize, to make law 
and to outlaw. Doing so realizes various economic and political inter-
ests in a globalized but still decentralized world society.117 The evolu-
tion of China’s approaches to international law since the Opium War 
has gone hand in hand with the evolution of the Western-dominated 
international law in terms of both its noble goals and dark sides.118 
Western-dominated international law takes “interest” in the cen-
tral concept of international cooperation and competition (while justice 
and morality) are disregarded. Legal positivism assumes that interna-
tional law, as a normative vision of the world society and as a 
 
 114.  See Routledge, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD (Matthew Happold ed., 
2012).; Bobo Lo, RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Brookings Inst. ed., 2015).; THE 
EMERGING POWERS AND THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER: BACK TO THE FUTURE? (Steen 
Fryba et. al. eds. 1st ed. 2016).; Barry Buzan, China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful 
Rise’ Possible?, 3 CHINESE J. OF INT’L POL. 5, 12 (2010). 
 115.  See Anghie, supra note 6. 
 116.  See KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE, supra note 6, at 199; Samuel Moyn, Knowledge 
and Politics in International Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2164 (2016); SHEILA JASANOFF, 
THE IDIOM OF CO-PRODUCTION, IN STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF 
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 1 (Sheila Jasanoff eds., 2004). 
 117.  See Focarelli, supra note 6, at 4.; Simpson, supra note 6.; KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE 
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 516-17; See Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO 
UTOPIA, supra note 15, at 562-617. 
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normative language for international discourse, could apolitically re-
port the reality of world society. However, due to ideological and struc-
tural biases in international law and international legal expertise, it 
cannot.119 Positivism in international law leads to the following conse-
quences: the detachment of law from reality, elimination of politics 
from law, and definitive transformation of law into a tool at the service 
of interests.120 
The positivism of international law ignores the reality of the world 
society and the evolution of international law in this world society. 
Thus, these ideological and structural biases inherited from imperial-
ism and other dimensions of the Eurocentric history of international 
law are covered up.121 The positivism of international law facilitates 
the embellishment of the Eurocentric history of international law. Fur-
ther positivism hides these biases to maintain the effectiveness, legiti-
macy and dominance of the contemporary Western-dominated inter-
national legal system and global governance paradigms. These 
ideological and structural biases are woven into the positivism of in-
ternational law and reinforced by the Eurocentric narratives of the his-
tory of international law. International law has never apolitically re-
ported on and responded to the reality of the world society.122 
If the science of international law, the normativity and positivism 
of international law, are not able to accurately respond to reality said 
law and legal scholarship become artificial rhetoric in close connection 
with power, interests and politics. The seemingly productive, system-
atization of international law and enhanced legitimacy of the Western-
dominated international law reinforces international law to be a tool 
for international exploitation and dominance by some countries.123 The 
result is injustice and conflicts in world society more injustices, imbal-
ances and potential conflicts in this world society as structural biases 
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and systematic violence are not removed but reinforced.124 Therefore, 
it is imperative to put the Western-dominated international law back 
into the broad historical context for a holistic and meaningful geology 
of international law, as historical and critical studies of international 
law are beneficial to achieve “a politically and historically informed 
account of the role of international law.”125 
Many analytical concepts and tools are used to illustrate the nature 
and evolution of the current Western-dominated international law and 
global governance.126 Deconstructing these assumptions and the 
knowledge-power production system in international law and interna-
tional legal scholarship gets ride of structural biases and systematic 
violence.127 
For instance, the perspective of the legitimacy of the current West-
ern-dominated international law and global governance touches upon 
a fundamental question about the evolution of international law: inter-
national institutions and rules should constantly evolve to response to 
the changing needs in this world society where sovereign states are still 
the principle actors; otherwise, they will decay by causing disorder, 
costs and risks as a result of the decline of their legitimacy.128 However, 
how does international law realistically evolve, and why? Whose order 
and disorder, benefits and burdens, justice and injustice, development 
and exploitation in the evolutionary processes? Who decides and how 
to decide the center and the peripheries of the projected structure of 
international law and global governance?129 These issues lead us to 
more insights on the sociology of international law. 
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Also, the global justice approach to international law effectively 
facilitates to take account of these injustices, imbalances and biases in 
the current realities of international rule of law.130 There is no funda-
mental incompatibility between global justice and international law, 
except that these structural biases in the current international legal sys-
tem embody a Western-dominated paradigm of morality and justice in 
international law and global governance, particularly the legal positiv-
ism of international law.131 However, all these biases and violence 
seem to be inevitable and fated, as the Western-dominated interna-
tional law has always been predominant actors’ tool for interests and 
power in the last several centuries.132 
From the perspective of international law as a language and cul-
ture of international cooperation and global governance, the nature and 
operation mode of the current Western-dominated international law 
would not change until the power structure transforms, and then a new 
mode of language and culture of international law comes into being 
with potentially different focuses and achievements. Only when a new 
theoretical framework is initiated and integrated into current interna-
tional legal practices and theories could it be possible to mitigate these 
structural biases and systematic violence. To that point, the multi-po-
larization trend, particularly the rise of China, may provide opportuni-
ties to break away from the age-old Eurocentrism and finally have a 
truly global base for international law and global governance.133 
As pointed out by Hoebel, “law is but a response to social 
needs.”134 That is more than true for international law in a world soci-
ety.135 International law is one form of social norms with the merit of 
stability and predictability to regulate the interfaces and exchanges 
among nations, and it is a legalized form of regulatory and distributive 
mechanisms with sovereignty elements and transnational factors.136 
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Now, the fabric of the international community and the solidarity of 
the world society are aggressively established, while “the conscious-
ness of the entity of the whole” in a world society is driven by diverse 
interests with different cost-benefit analyses in reality.137 
The current Western-dominated international law is a language of 
power and interests in the name of normative rules, which manifests 
the Western culture of global governance. From the perspective of the 
colonization of life world by systems in Habermas’s “Theory of Com-
municative Action,” these structural biases and systematic violence 
manifest the colonization of the interests (money) and power in inter-
national political and social system onto international law as a com-
municative language, as well as their colonization onto international 
legal scholarship as a medium for social reflection.138 Also, from the 
perspective of “the West and the Rest” dichotomy, these structural bi-
ases in international law and international legal expertise are en-
trenched in the civilizing mission and colonial confrontation with the 
dominance of the West over the rest.139 
Furthermore, the power-knowledge co-production paradigm for 
the structural biases in international legal scholarship could produce 
vicious circles in global governance. Firstly, the structural biases in 
international legal expertise would facilitate and reinforce the struc-
tural biases in international law and the dominance of the West for 
some time, by constantly excluding and oppressing non-Western pow-
ers and knowledge. Secondly, the first step leads to new powers and 
knowledge being excluded in the existing communities, and establish-
ing separate portals by regime proliferation and rule complexity be-
comes a cost-effective option for emerging powers. Thus, the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of the existing Western-dominated 
international law and knowledge will be diluted. Thirdly, not until the 
cost-benefit analysis of this sort of interaction goes against the pre-
dominant West does the reformulation of these communities start. 
Hence, the governance and transaction costs for these proliferation, 
complex and disorders could be substantial. However, that is the nature 
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of power politics and diplomacy in a Western-dominated world soci-
ety. 
Then, what kinds of impacts will China’s approaches to the West-
ern-dominated international law and the rise of China have on the evo-
lution and future of international law in this globalized, multipolar and 
decentralized world society? Generally, changes to international legal 
rules and regimes are gradually achieved through regime proliferation, 
rule complexity and thereafter their interaction.140 Changes are based 
on existing rules and regimes, and new stakeholders need to cooperate 
with previous dominant authorities.141 Thus, any overall overthrow of 
existing structure of interests in international law is not feasible. A 
more interdependent world system does not mean the decline of the 
past powers and the rise of new hegemonies, but means more pillars 
and stakeholders for better balance of interests in global governance 
and enhanced legitimacy of international law.142 
Therefore, on the one hand, China will continue its constructive 
engagement within the current international legal system in the short 
term, trying to make a difference in the system.143 On the other hand, 
China will make efforts to establish China-led regional mechanism in 
the Asia-Pacific region and then reform the current global order on the 
long run by introducing new contents, paradigms and connotations 
from its civilization to the language of international law and culture of 
global governance.144 Namely, it is the implementation of the strategy 
of “keep a low profile and achieve something” (taoguangyanghui, 
yousuozuowei) and “learning Western science and technology on the 
basis of Chinese culture and learning” (zhongtixiyong).145 More im-
portantly, China’s approaches to international law and the rise of China 
could be an opportunity to rectify these structural biases and systematic 
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violence in the current Western-dominated international law with a 
more democratic and balanced approach, if “a more democratic and 
balanced approach” partly means more invoices and interests of main 
stakeholders are taken into consideration. 
In conclusion, the structural biases and systemic violence of Eu-
rocentrism in the current Western-dominated international law and in-
ternational legal scholarship are integral components of “the clash of 
ignorance” amidst the evolution of international law in this globalized 
but decentralized world society. The rise of China could be an oppor-
tunity to rectify these structural biases and systematic violence in the 
current Western-dominated international law with a more democratic 
and balanced approach. 
Conclusion 
The era of the unchallenged centrality of Europe and the West, as 
well as the Chinese traditional world order, is now in the past. How-
ever, far from the end of the story, a new stage has been set for the 
participation and competition of different civilizations in global gov-
ernance and international law. One of the greatest challenges to inter-
national law and international politics is still the lag in the evolution of 
international institutions behind social needs and changes in this world 
society.146 
From the Opium War to the South China Sea arbitration case, tra-
ditional Chinese international law and world order have always been 
evolving and functioning covertly, along with growing divergences be-
tween Chinese (perceptions of) international law and the Western-
dominated international law as a result of the clash of ignorance. The 
future of international law lies in historical and critical reflections of 
the current injustice, imbalances, structural biases and systematic vio-
lence from the perspective of both the Self (the West) and the Other 
(the Rest); and, the rise of China is likely to restructure the inclusion 
and exclusion on the economic and political levels in international law. 
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